Theory of Mind Without a Language Model: Effects of Social Experience, Education and Language Exposure by gagne, Deanna L
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Master's Theses University of Connecticut Graduate School
3-10-2015
Theory of Mind Without a Language Model:
Effects of Social Experience, Education and
Language Exposure
Deanna L. gagne
University of Connecticut - Storrs, deanna.gagne@uconn.edu
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Connecticut Graduate School at OpenCommons@UConn. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenCommons@UConn. For more information, please contact
opencommons@uconn.edu.
Recommended Citation
gagne, Deanna L., "Theory of Mind Without a Language Model: Effects of Social Experience, Education and Language Exposure"
(2015). Master's Theses. 724.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/724
  
Theory of Mind Without a Language Model: Effects of Social 
























Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
 
Requirements for the Degree of 
 































































I would like to express my deepest gratitude first and foremost to my advisor, Dr. Marie 
Coppola. Over the last five years, Marie has transitioned from boss to advisor to trusted friend.  
Her guidance and support has been invaluable to the development of my work and to my growth 
as a researcher. Without her, I would not be where I am today. 
 It then goes without saying that I could not have succeeded without the love and support 
of my family: my husband Kurt, my in-laws Elaine and Gordy Gueutal, along with my two 
wonderful boys, have contributed to my life in ways that are innumerable and invaluable. 
 While this document carries my name, this research could not have been completed 
without the coding, editing, and data collection contributions of Eli Miranda, Russell Richie, 
Julia (Fanghella) Adell, Emily Carrigan, Devika Prasad, John Gerrity, Rachel Kriet, and 
Cassandra Svelnys. I am grateful to Dr. Jennie Pyers for sharing her previous experiences and 
techniques, to Dr. Ann Senghas for her feedback and guidance both in the field and in the “lab,” 
and to Drs. Letitia Naigles, Rhiannon Smith, Diane Lillo-Martin, the Thursday morning Sign 
Language Reading and Discussion Group, and the joint Coppola, Naigles, and Bortfeld lab 
discussion group for their helpful feedback. 
 Finally, I most sincerely thank the Deaf community. I was born into the Deaf-World – a 
world that most assume is silent and isolating, yet which for me is vibrant, visually loud, and 
close-knit. I thank my Deaf parents for supporting and encouraging me to love all aspects of my 
being: my Latina and European heritage, my English, American Sign Language and Spanish 
languages, my place as an educated woman. I also could not go without thanking the newest 
extension of my Deaf-World: the deaf Nicaraguans I have worked with and their families. They 
have welcomed me into their lives, shared their language and experiences with me and thus lent 
their collective voices to what we know about the human experience. 
iii
 This research was supported by NSF Graduate Research Fellowship # DGE-1247393 and 
University of Connecticut El Instituto Travel Research grant; NIH grant P30 DC010751 to M. 




Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities, i.e., the understanding that others have internal states that 
differ from one’s own, and that these states guide behavior, are multiply determined. ToM abilities 
underlie later social and pragmatic abilities, grossly affecting later life experiences, particularly for 
deaf children. However, previous studies have not clearly identified the effects of language, hearing 
status, or other exogenous factors, such as education or executive function abilities, on ToM 
development. To disentangle these, we studied three understudied populations in Nicaragua: 
Homesigners, who have not acquired a conventional language but have developed gestural 
communication systems; users of Nicaraguan Sign Language, an emerging language (NSL Signers); 
and Unschooled Spanish Speakers. Comparing these groups can help uncover the relative 
contributions to ToM of social experience (available to all groups), membership in a linguistic 
community (NSL Signers and Unschooled Spanish Speakers only), and education (only NSL 
Signers), thus providing critical information that distinguishes among current theories, and that 
informs language planning and policy decisions supporting healthy development in deaf children.  
Using a minimally verbal ToM protocol in which participants experienced two types of 
False-Belief (vs. being told of them): Unexpected Contents and Appearance/Reality; a minimally 
verbal Inhibitory Control task; two perspective-taking tasks; and a memory span task, we found 
that: 1) Language was most related to success on False-Belief measures of ToM as well as to 
transformational memory span tasks, while 2) Education was most related to success on conflict-
Inhibitory Control tasks.  Performance on non-transformational memory span tasks, non-conflict 
Inhibitory Control, and Perspective Taking did not differ across groups, suggesting that those 
without education or a language community nevertheless develop these cognitive abilities. 
In sum, the results suggest a complex interaction among language, inhibitory control 
executive function, and education for Theory of Mind Development, and highlight language as a 




1.1. What is Theory of Mind and why is it important? 
Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand that others have beliefs and desires 
different from one’s own beliefs, desires, or from what reality shows to be true, and the 
additional understanding that those beliefs and desires may in turn influence others’ behavior 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983, Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985, a.o.), is a foundational aspect of 
human social cognition. It allows us to understand others’ intentions & behavior, and allows us 
to take others’ perspectives and understand why someone else may not know what we know or 
see things the same way as we ourselves may. 
ToM is not just about understanding others-- it has crucial implications for interpersonal 
interactions. That is, ToM’s biggest impact is not only on the internal human experience (our 
observations and contemplations of others), but also in our external, daily interactions. For 
example, without a fully developed ToM, it is difficult to have a “normal” conversation in which 
two individuals cooperatively create common ground (e.g., Grice, 1989). Difficulties in this 
realm, such as providing too much or too little information in conversation, can affect others’ 
perceptions. Knowing how much information to give, depending on your interlocutor, has its 
foundation in ToM abilities (Astington, 1990, Charman et al., 1998).  
While the overall importance of ToM to human interaction is not argued, aspects of its 
developmental trajectory are (e.g. Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001).  In Figure 1, we see that 
ToM is not a single ability; to develop a mature ToM one develops a variety of abilities over 
time that culminate in very sophisticated interpersonal and communicative abilities, such as 
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Figure 1: Milestones of various abilities relating to Theory of Mind. 
the use of appropriate narrative devices and figurative language, e.g., sarcasm (Wellman & Liu, 
2004; Peterson, Wellman & Slaughter 2012). 
Interestingly, the earlier, nonverbal abilities are not usually the basis of debate; it is clear 
that infants can imitate other humans at a very early age (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1983, Meltzoff 
& Decety, 2003, Nadel et al., 1999), and begin to follow points and other nonverbal 
communicative acts shortly thereafter (e.g., Leung & Rheingold, 1981, Phillips et al., 2002, 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Along the same lines, the later abilities are also not very hotly 
debated either; it is clear that one must have mastered at least some linguistic abilities in order to 
use that language for figurative speech acts. What is argued, however, is the moment at which 
language begins to play a crucial role in the conceptualization of others’ thoughts, beliefs, and 
desires, and the understanding that others’ behaviors are driven by their own thoughts, beliefs 
and desires, and finally, that that drive may result in behaviors that are different from one’s own.   
Some argue that the ability to understand others’ thoughts and beliefs is available very 
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believe that this ability is not available until later in childhood, at about the age of four or five 
years (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In either case, it is well documented that overt measures of 
Theory of Mind, i.e., those in which participants must explicitly make decisions, act on, or 
respond with language (as opposed to covert, or more implicit, measures that rely on first looks, 
looking time, or infant surprise response) are not usually passed until about 4 or 5 years, after 
significant language and social developmental gains have been accomplished by the child (e.g., 
de Villiers & Pyers 2002, Villiers & de Villiers, 2012, Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Because social 
and linguistic gains occur concurrently, it is difficult to disentangle the relative contributions of 
each in the development of ToM, and thus an active debate exists regarding which of these 
abilities is most implicated in the development of ToM.  This active debate is reflected in two 
major theoretical camps. 
1.2 Simulation Theories vs. Language-based Theories of ToM Development 
1.2.1 The development of mature ToM abilities based in social experience 
Social experiences undoubtedly are fundamental to typical and optimal human 
development. In the early experiences of a child, it is the interaction with his caregivers that lays 
the groundwork for later understanding about the world. Infants respond to caretakers’ affect, for 
example, infants with depressed or anxious mothers later show different responses to happy, 
surprised or angry faces when compared to infants of mothers who were not anxious or 
depressed (Vanderwert et al., 2014). Later, social experiences underscore children’s 
understanding of friendships and other relationships – both positively and negatively (e.g., 
Gottman et al., 1975, Selman, 1980, Smith & Rose, 2011).  The obvious need for social 
interaction in human development has sparked many interesting fields of research regarding the 
importance of social experiences in shaping aspects of human cognition. 
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For example, some theorists suggest that it is the participation in social interactions which 
leads to our understanding of ourselves and others as social beings – it is the interaction which 
helps to shape the individual rather than the other way around. This participatory sense-making 
(De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, De Jaegher et al., 2010) rejects even the construct of a Theory of 
Mind and suggests instead that there “is an explicit two-way link between individual and social 
processes, leaving open the possibility for individual cognitive skills to have dual or even purely 
social developmental origins” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). 
Other theorists suggest that social experiences provide us with information about others 
through our own experiences. Proponents of so-called Simulation Theories argue that life 
experience and social interactions are sufficient to scaffold mature ToM abilities, without the 
need for language (e.g., Goldman, 1992, Gordon, 1986, Nickerson, 1999). On this view, one’s 
own experiences provide the foundation for ToM by serving as a template for understanding how 
others will behave in a given similar situation; these templates are updated as one gains more life 
experience.  
These theories are argued primarily in the philosophical realm with little to no empirical 
data specific to the mechanisms of simulation (e.g., Gordon, 1986).  However, recent 
neuroimaging research in the “mirror neurons” of non-human primates, which typically show 
responses in motor control regions when passively observing others’ motoric behavior (e.g., 
Kohler et al., 2002) have also bolstered recent interest in Simulation Theories. Mirror neurons 
have been argued to possibly provide a neurologic clue to how humans could be “wired” for 
social interactions, and more importantly, as a neurologic basis for understanding other minds 
(e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998, Iacoboni, 2009) through reflection. In fact, studies using EEG 
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measures looking for mirror neuron activity in populations with known deficits in Theory of 
Mind abilities show decreased activity (Oberman et al., 2005) in anticipated mirror neuron 
networks, thus encouraging theories linking mirror neurons with Theory of Mind abilities 
(Gallese, 2007). Importantly, these neuroimaging studies, like most other neuroimaging studies, 
can only show neural firing in the presence of ToM-related stimuli, but do not explain explicit 
understanding and related abilities, i.e., the mechanisms relating these neural firings to ToM-
related behavior. 
According to most socially-based theories of ToM, but in particular the simulation 
theories, language can play a part in the development of ToM, primarily because language 
provides a way to interact more with others, providing opportunities to update one’s knowledge 
more efficiently. In the end, however, it is the reflection on one’s own experiences that primarily 
supports the understanding of other minds via a social scaffold. 
1.2.2 The development of mature ToM abilities based in language experience 
Other researchers argue that it is language development, and possibly specific linguistic 
structures, that is essential to the child’s development of a mature ToM. Mental verbs (Gola, 
2012, Howard et al., 2008, Pyers & Senghas, 2009) and complement clause structures (de 
Villiers & de Villiers, 2000, de Villiers & Pyers, 2002), for example, have been associated with 
the development of ToM abilities, as measured by the gold standard task for assessing ToM: the 
false belief task (FB) (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
The False Belief (FB) task is designed to elicit a response from the child participant by 
asking about another’s beliefs given certain events. For example, in the Smarties task (An 
unexpected-contents task involving M&M-like candies; Gopnik & Astington, 1988), the child is 
shown a Smarties candy box and is asked what he thinks is in the box.  Given the box’s outward 
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appearance, it is a reasonable and likely response to say that there must be Smarties candies in 
the box. The child is then allowed to open the box (or is shown the contents of the box), at which 
point the child learns that there are actually other objects inside, such as multicolored paper clips. 
The box is then closed and the child may be asked again what he thinks is in the box for 
confirmation that he remembers that it actually contains paper clips, not Smarties. Then another 
character is introduced, often in the form of a puppet, who was not present for the initial 
interaction. The puppet is introduced to the child and the child is then asked what the puppet 
thinks is in the box.  The child is considered to have passed if he says that the puppet will say 
there are Smarties in the box, showing that the child realizes that the puppet was not there for the 
reveal of what is actually in the box, and must be going on the box’s outward appearance only.  
On the other hand, the child is considered to have failed the task if he responds that the puppet 
will think there are paper clips in the box (what is actually in the box, not some other random 
object). This is believed to be evidence that the child cannot separate his own thoughts, beliefs, 
or knowledge from those of others. 
Other variants of the FB task include Appearance/Reality (A/R) tasks in which an object 
or scene appears to be one way, but in reality is not (e.g., fake food (Pyers, 2005)), and Change-
of-Location tasks in which an object is placed in one location in the presence of a character, is 
moved while that character is out of sight, and then that character returns to retrieve the object 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Arguments against the FB task as a measure of ToM say that the task 
is inherently linguistically based as it requires the understanding of a complex sentence (i.e., 
“What does Elmo think is in the box?” or “What will Elmo will say is in the box?”), and is thus 
actually a measure of language ability in ToM than true ToM understanding (e.g., Wellman, 
Cross & Watson, 2001). 
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However compelling arguments against the validity of the FB task are, general 
complexity in language is not the only determining factor in passing FB tasks. Hale & Tager-
Flusberg (2003) found that training on sentential complements (e.g., “The boy said he kissed 
Grover.”), but not similarly complex relative clauses (e.g., “Bert hugged the girl who jumped up 
and down.”), improved children’s ToM performance on False Belief tasks relative to pre-training 
levels. Therefore, those advocating for language-based theories argue that it is some aspect of 
language that is central to normal ToM development, such as the presence of mental verbs in the 
child’s vocabulary (Howard et al., 2008, Gola, 2012, Pyers & Senghas, 2009, Shatz et al., 1983), 
or the complement clauses they oftentimes require (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000, de Villiers & 
Pyers, 2002). 
1.3 Executive Function (EF) and the development of ToM abilities 
While language proficiency or access to rich social interactions are often debated as 
being the crucial element needed by a typically developing child to achieve understanding of 
other minds, there are nevertheless other abilities argued to be necessary in order to achieve 
higher-level ToM abilities, and in particular, to correctly maneuver a False Belief task. In 
addition to the early ToM-specific abilities (Figure 1) such as understanding intentionality 
(Behne et al., 2005, Gergely et al., 1995, Philips et al., 2002) and the ability to take another’s 
perspective (Piaget, 1956, Masangkay et al., 1974, Flavell et al., 1981), other general (not 
specific to ToM) cognitive abilities have been argued to be necessary for proper ToM 
development.  These usually fall in the realm of the Executive Functions, and more specifically, 
Working Memory and Inhibitory Control. 
The executive functions (EF) are a “heterogeneous collection of skills that, in various 
ways, aid in the monitoring and control of thought and action” (Carlson et al., 2002).  These 
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skills mature as frontal lobe function matures, usually achieving adult levels by 25 years of age 
(Stuss & Knight, 2013), and are strongly implicated in Theory of Mind functioning as they aid in 
the processing of the information required to process a False Belief, or other higher-order ToM 
skills. Importantly, even when Theory of Mind abilities are considered to be available to very 
young infants, or even present at birth, theorists allow for ToM abilities to be limited or bolstered 
by EF abilities (Gordon & Olson, 1998). 
EF has been investigated as part of ToM studies around the globe, showing that EF 
predicts ToM abilities over and above general intelligence (Carlson et al., 2002), can be used to 
predict later ToM abilities in development (Carlson et al., 2004), and can be assisted by the 
suggested EF bolstering that comes with bilingualism (Bialystok & Senman, 2004).     
An additional important consideration for our purposes is the effect of educational 
experiences on EF development (and by extension, on FB performance).  Some research shows a 
relationship between EF and education (e.g., Sabbagh et al., 2006), whereas others find no effect 
(Ostrosky-Solis et al., 2004). Because the populations of interest in the present studies vary 
greatly in their educational levels it is important to find ways to address the effects of educational 
experiences themselves, apart from the other factors that have been described earlier (see section 
2 for rationale behind the current study design). 
1.4 Deaf individuals as an informative population 
The debate between linguistically- and socially- based arguments for ToM development 
continues because we still cannot easily disentangle the relative contribution of each of these 
factors in typically developing children: by 4-5 years of age, children have amassed enough 
social experience and acquired sufficient language to successfully navigate FB tasks, and 
implicit tasks (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, Low, 2010, Meristo et al., 2012) do not provide 
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enough evidence that the measured behavior is actually based on the understanding of others’ 
internal beliefs. What is required to disentangle these factors is a population that shows normal 
development in one or the other ability (i.e., normal ability in social interaction without language 
development), and a task that provides behavioral measures of FB without relying on language to 
access that knowledge.  We find this combination in deaf1 children born to families who can hear 
and do not know sign language. 
Ninety to 95 percent of deaf children are born to parents who can hear (Mitchell & 
Karchmer, 2004, Moores, 2001, Vaccari & Marschark, 1997). Given that most of these families 
do not know sign language and the child is not able to access the spoken language due to their 
hearing loss, the child may likely spend some time without any linguistic2 input. They do, 
however experience typical social interactions and therefore still have opportunities to visually 
learn about affect, pointing, intentionality, and the like. 
This study is not the first to investigate Theory of Mind development with deaf 
individuals, but it is only in the last two decades that the issue of language exposure has been 
raised. Crucially, researchers have become aware of the importance of separating Deaf children 
with Deaf parents (who experience early language exposure) from deaf children with hearing 
parents (who experience relatively late exposure to language3). Thus, contrary to previous 
                                                            
1 It is standard to use a capital “D” in “Deaf” when referring to a group of individuals with hearing loss 
who share cultural values, norms, political perspectives, and a language. A capital “D” will only be used 
with in the text when it is sure that those being referred to fit this definition. Note, even in the United 
States, not all persons with hearing loss are part of the Deaf community. 
2 Some aspects of human communication (i.e., the use of gesture) are still hotly debated as to whether 
they should be considered part of the linguistic system. For the purpose of this paper, “linguistic” refers to 
the communicative system used by the community. 
3 Note that there are hearing parents of deaf children who do choose to learn to sign as soon as they find 
out that their child is deaf. While this is not always the case (many hearing parents choose to have their 
child learn to speak and to use listening devices such as hearing aids or cochlear implants) (Mauldin 
2011, 2012), the parents who do sign are still in the early stages of acquiring a sign language during a 
critical time in their deaf child’s language development, and parents often do not become fluent 
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findings which found that deaf children are delayed as a group relative to similarly-aged children 
with normal hearing at ToM-related tasks (e.g., Lundy, 2002, Russell, 1998), we see that early 
language exposure (Meristo et al., 2012, Peterson, 1999, Woolfe et al., 2000), and likely 
specifically exposure to language referring to mental states (Moeller & Schick, 2006, Rhys-Jones 
& Ellis, 2000, Schick et al., 2007) eliminates this difference.  
Moreover, a language benefit has been found for two unexpected groups: very young 
deaf children and within deaf children with deaf parents. Meristo and colleagues (2012) found 
that infants of about 17- 26 months of age with hearing parents who do not use a sign language 
experience delays in anticipating the actions of a character with a false belief as compared to 
counterparts with normal hearing (measured by anticipatory looking).  Furthermore, Meristo and 
colleagues (2007) found that within a group of deaf children with deaf parents, differences can 
still be found for the rate of FB success depending on the child’s educational environment (e.g., 
orally-based education with limited sign support vs. sign-based education with a rich sign 
community). 
Therefore, the current series of studies aims to isolate participation in a linguistic 
community as a contributing factor to ToM success by using a minimally verbal, experiential 
False Belief task with individuals who have varying levels of access to others who share a 
language with them.  Other potentially important factors are also tested, namely participants’ 
abilities to understand others’ visual perspectives, their working memory spans and inhibitory 
control abilities.  These tasks are elaborated further in section 2.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
themselves. Thus, the input to the child from the hearing, signing parent is not as linguistically rich as it 
would be from a Deaf signing parent (Peterson, 1999). 
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2. Rationale for current study design 
 As part of the body of work investigating the communicative and cognitive effects of age 
of language exposure, there is a growing sub-field investigating the effects of no language 
exposure as well as the effects of exposure to an emerging language rather than to an established 
language4.  Some of this work has focused on the language system itself, for example, the 
linguistic structures available in the sign systems of individuals with no language exposure (e.g., 
Brentari et al., 2012, Coppola & Newport, 2005, Goldin-Meadow, 2003); those using an 
emerging language (e.g., Coppola & Senghas, 2010, Coppola et al., 2013, Senghas, 2003, 
Senghas et al., 2004), and the development and comprehension of the system by those in the 
signers’ communicative circles (e.g., Carrigan & Coppola, 2012, Richie et al., 2014,). Other 
work has examined the effect of a lack of language exposure, or exposure to an emerging 
language, on other aspects of cognitive development, such as number cognition (e.g., Spaepen et 
al., 2011) and ToM development (Morgan & Kegl, 2006, Pyers, 2005, Pyers & Senghas 2009,). 
 In the previous Theory of Mind work with an emerging sign language in Nicaragua that 
is less than 40 years old, researchers have found relationships between participants’ language 
exposure and ToM abilities.  For example, Pyers (2005) and Pyers and Senghas (2009) found 
differences in False Belief success between signing groups depending on the number of mental 
verbs in the lexicon, and their frequency of use, across different cohorts of signers. Thus, signers 
representing an older group of sign language users (“Cohort 1,” see section 2.1.2 for a full 
description) who had been exposed to the language in its early stages did not have as many 
mental verbs in their productions as later, younger signers (“Cohort 2”) who had been exposed to 
the language after it had evolved some (and who had Cohort 1 signers as their language models). 
                                                            
4 Most spoken languages are considered to be established languages, as many of them (even what we now 
call “creoles”) have a long history with many speakers of the language.  Even American Sign Language, a 
relatively new language, has a 200-year history (Groce, 2009). 
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Work by Morgan and Kegl (2006) with deaf Nicaraguans5 confirmed previous studies in 
the United States that success on Theory of Mind tasks is dependent on the age of exposure to a 
sign language (before or after the age of 10) and can also be correlated with the production of 
mental state language in narrative. 
 To add to this body of work, the current study proposes to extend our understanding of 
the relationship between language exposure and social experience with ToM-related abilities by 
looking at Homesigners, Nicaraguan signers, and Nicaraguan Spanish speakers who have little to 
no educational experiences (as a comparison group).   By including these three specific groups, it 
allows us to more specifically isolate the effects of not participating in a linguistic community by 
contrasting participants who do and do not participate in a linguistic community and those who 
do and do not have the opportunity to receive educational experiences.  This is of particular 
import, because for Cohort 1 signers, the very place they are introduced to a linguistic 
community is the same place they receive an education. The two experiences cannot be divorced 
for Cohort 1 participants, or, for that matter, for deaf children from families who do not sign. 
2.1 The participants 
2.1.1 Homesigners 
 As briefly mentioned above, homesigners are deaf individuals who are born to and raised 
by families who are not deaf and who don’t know a sign language (Coppola, 2002, Coppola & 
                                                            
5 Morgan and Kegl’s participants are not divided into cohorts in the way that the NSL groups are for 
many of Senghas’, Coppola’s, and Pyers’ studies. Morgan and Kegl’s (2006) participants were from a 
city on the east (Atlantic) coast of the country (Bluefields), which is highly inaccessible from the western 
part of Nicaragua, the site of Managua, the capital. Bluefields can be easily reached only by plane, or by 
an arduous boat journey requiring multiple days. This distance from the capital means that the language 
was already well established and still developing in the Managuan deaf community by the time it reached 
Bluefields and there is likely no critical mass of deaf individuals in Bluefields to truly evolve the 
language in the way it has been evolving in Managua. Likely language change has been happening in 
Bluefields, but on a smaller scale, given a) the size of the community there, b) the amount of access the 
deaf individuals have to each other, c) the ages of the deaf community members in the area, and d) the 
relatively limited contact they have with individuals coming from Managua. 
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Newport, 2005, Goldin-Meadow, 2003, a.o.).  Because they do not have access to the spoken 
language around them, they develop their own gestural-communicative systems called homesign. 
With the standardization of newborn hearing screening in the United States, it is not common 
anymore for deaf children to spend much time without any attempts to address their 
communication needs (although many spoken-language attempts are unsuccessful) (Mauldin, 
2011, 2012). 
 In developing countries like Nicaragua, however, newborn hearing screening is not 
widely available, and so when a mother realizes her child is deaf, there are not many options for 
education, either using auditory means (e.g., a magnification system plus spoken language) or a 
sign language (Polich, 2005). Despite their lack of conventional linguistic input, homesigners in 
Nicaragua continue to use their gesture systems as their primary means of communication into 
adulthood. They do not appear to be socially impaired; they enjoy relatively typical social 
interactions with their hearing families, friends, and neighbors. While homesign is not a fully 
developed language, mature homesign systems exhibit a range of linguistic properties found in 
fully-developed languages such as the grammatical relation of subject (Coppola & Newport, 
2005), and thus signifies an emerging language system without the fully developed structure of 
established languages. Thus, Homesigners represent a group with little to no exposure to 
conventional linguistic input, as well as little to no educational experience (Table 1). 
2.1.2 Nicaraguan Sign Language: An emerging language 
One of the main advantages of research with recently emerging languages is the 
opportunity to measure the effects of absent or atypical linguistic input and the linguistic and 
cognitive benefits conferred by participating in a linguistic community. Like Homesigners, 
Cohort 1 signers of Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL) (the first group of signers to begin 
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creating the language at a newly re-established center for special education in Managua during 
the late l970s to early 1980s), did not have access to linguistic input transmitted vertically, that 
is, from a pre-existing language model. However, Cohort 1 signers did engage in language 
genesis with their peers (horizontal transmission) (Senghas et al., 2005).   
NSL signers of all cohorts (cohort 1 and the subsequent children who entered the school 
later, representing cohorts 2, 3, and so on) interact with many other users who use the system as 
a primary language, i.e., members of the Deaf community in Managua, and are thus part of a 
linguistic community. Homesigners, by comparison, rely on using their gesture systems with 
hearing people their entire lives -- hearing people who only use these gestures with the 
homesigner and never with each other.  In other words, the benefit of the horizontal transmission 
experienced by cohort 1 signers is absent from the homesigners’ experience because there is no 
network of gesturers/signers to contribute to language genesis.  Empirical and computational 
evidence suggests that the rich interconnections among users that characterize typical 
sociolinguistic communities are essential for developing some aspects of linguistic structure, 
e.g., a conventionalized lexicon (Richie et al., 2014).6  
Another significant difference between Homesigners and Cohort 1 signers is the fact that 
Cohort 1’s (and subsequent cohorts’) introduction to the linguistic community is situated within 
an educational or vocational context (Polich, 2001, Senghas et al., 2005).  As it is for most deaf 
children born to parents who do not already know a sign language, it is the schools that provide 
both educational and primary linguistic experiences through peer interactions.  This will be 
explained further in the context of the next group, the unschooled hearing Spanish speakers in 
                                                            
6 Further, each homesigner’s mother does not share the system even with the homesigner-- despite having 
used it over a very long period of time (Carrigan & Coppola, 2012). By these criteria, the homesigner, 
hearing family members and friends who use homesign, and their patterns of interaction do not constitute 




To reiterate, the primary reason for including Cohort 1 signers as a comparison group to 
homesigners to see the effects of having a linguistic community on ToM abilities (Table 1). 
As mentioned, there is precedence for investigating ToM abilities in Cohort 1 signers; the current 
study has adapted a task previously used by Pyers (2005), allowing for results from the current 
study to be compared with previous results on the same task. In this task, Cohort 2 outperformed 
Cohort 1 overall (Pyers, 2005), with Cohort 1 signers having moderate success on Appearance/ 
Reality items and no success with Unexpected Contents items. To clarify, although both 
Appearance/ Reality and Unexpected Contents tasks are both considered False Belief tasks, 
success on one may not guarantee success on the other.  This makes the Pyers (2005) results 
more interesting: recall that Cohort 1 had no language model -- there was no older group of 
interlocutors from which to learn their language, nor anyone within the peer group who had had 
access to a conventional language model. Additionally, Cohort 1 participants were tested in 
adulthood, eliminating the possibility that additional ToM abilities could later develop given 
enough time. Therefore, two questions could be asked:  1) Could the ability to succeed at 
Appearance/ Reality tasks be available to humans regardless of the language input they receive 
(or not), thus leading to a difference in success on Appearance/ Reality tasks as compared to 
Unexpected Contents tasks?  Or perhaps, could participation in a linguistic community be 
enough to scaffold this ability, regardless of how developed the language is (i.e., the existence 
and frequency of the use of mental verbs, complex clauses, or consistency of grammatical 
structures within and between users of the language)?  
2.1.3 Unschooled Nicaraguan Spanish Speakers 
As mentioned, like most deaf children born to hearing parents who do not know a sign language, 
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the vast majority of NSL signers in past and present studies gained access to their linguistic 
community via educational settings (Polich, 2001). Thus, we cannot separate having a linguistic 
community from education in either NSL signers (who have both) or Homesigners, who have 
neither. Thus Unschooled Spanish Speakers are introduced (Table 1). They represent individuals 
who have full access to a language community but have little to no education.  Unfortunately it is 
virtually impossible to find a group of participants to test the opposite circumstances from the 
Unschooled Spanish Speakers – this would require participants who fully interact in an 
educational setting (and thus enjoy the benefits of education) without having any exposure to 
language in or out of the classroom. 
Note that the Unschooled Spanish Speakers do not have educational experiences for 
anticipated reasons: the family businesses needed the extra hands. Four of the five unschooled 
hearing participants were full-time agricultural workers; the fifth worked making tortillas for the 
family business. Their lack of education primarily resulted from economic restrictions and the 
distance to the nearest school. 
2.2 Recruitment methods 
 Participants were recruited either as part of a long-standing, ongoing research relationship 
with the research group (for homesigners and NSL signers), or, for the Unschooled Spanish 































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3 Current study tasks 
2.3.1 Visual Perspective Taking 
A visual perspective-taking task is first introduced to test a key precursor to later, more 
abstract, Theory of Mind abilities.  This task essentially asks a) whether a participant 
understands that another individual can have a different experience than their own and b) 
whether the participant can mentalize or visualize what the other may be seeing.  This is a 
task with a long history in developmental psychology (see section 3.1 for a more 
thorough description), and is generally accepted as a developmental precursor to later 
Theory of Mind abilities. 
Courtin and Melot (2005) suggest that it is the visual perspective taking abilities 
required by many sign language structures (French Sign Language (LSF), for their 
purposes) that aid Deaf children with Deaf parents in developing ToM abilities. However, 
the ability to understand others’ perspective is available very early on in typically 
developing hearing children as well (Flavell, 1981, 1984, Masangkay, 1974) and resides 
along the continuum of ToM abilities as an important precursor to the FB task (Figure 1). 
To date, we have no clear evidence of what perspective taking abilities are available to 
those with no language exposure. Perspective taking tasks are thus included in this study 
to investigate a) the relationship of language exposure to perspective taking, and b) 
whether life experience (even without a language) boosts perspective-taking abilities. 
2.3.2 False Belief 
The false belief task is chosen here as the measure of interest because of its 
unique place in the development of ToM-related abilities for typically developing 
children.  As we can see in Figure 1, ToM as a general ability relates to many low- and 
 19 
high-level abilities along a typical developmental trajectory.  Interestingly, the low-level 
abilities (to the left of the FB task) are primarily nonverbal abilities that are measured 
using nonverbal approaches, and the high-level abilities (to the right of the FB task) are 
primarily verbal abilities, and are measured using language.  It is the FB task that 
presents a unique position in that it could be grouped as a non-verbal (and thus 
potentially social) ability, or it could be primarily verbal, and grouped as such. Using a 
nonverbal false belief task would eliminate the participants’ expressive language ability 
within the task as the pivotal factor for success and would instead highlight the 
participant’s ability to understand others thoughts. 
2.3.3 Executive Functions 
 Two Executive Function tasks are introduced, testing Working Memory (WM) 
and Inhibitory Control (IC). These have been included for three reasons: 1) they have 
been previously implicated in ToM success - specifically FB success (e.g., Carlson et al., 
2002, 2004, Sabbagh et al., 2006) for their contribution to the ability to suppress one’s 
own knowledge of the reality of the situation in order to favor the other individual’s 
(incorrect) belief; 2) there as yet is no body of research investigating EF abilities within 
Homesigners and NSL signers and 3) we can compare results within this study to 
previous studies investigating the effects of education on executive function abilities 
(e.g., Ostrosky-Solis et al., 2004). 
2.4 Procedures for conveying task instructions 
 While all tasks in the current studies were chosen because they could be 
conducted nonverbally, we gave instructions in a specific language when possible to 
maximize participants’ understanding of the task instructions and procedure (i.e., spoken 
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Spanish was used with the hearing participants and NSL was used with the NSL signers). 
Gestural communication was used with the homesigners. Thus, the choice was made to 
prioritize comprehension of task instructions over standardization of the protocol. No 
script could have been written to meet the needs of this communicatively diverse group 
of participants, and completely nonverbal (solely gestural) tasks proved to be 
cumbersome and confusing for some hearing participants.    
2.5 Current study predictions 
2.5.1 Perspective Taking 
 Given that perspective taking abilities are available to children rather early in life 
(Flavell, 1981, 1984, Masangkay, 1974), no differences were predicted between 
homesigners, NSL signers, and Unschooled Spanish Speakers. Given the average ages of 
the participants, the current study cannot disentangle the effects of general life 
experiences on Perspective Taking abilities. 
2.5.2 False Belief 
Homesigners, who do not participate in a linguistic community, and thus are 
unlikely to have developed the linguistic structures that support FB understanding, were 
not predicted to succeed. Prior results (Pyers, 2005) suggested that some NSL Signers 
would succeed. Given that the Spanish speakers are adults with typical developmental 
histories, they were expected to succeed. 
2.5.3. Executive Functions 
2.5.3.1 Inhibitory Control 
 Given previous work on Inhibitory Control in unschooled, low socioeconomic 
status populations (Ostrosky-Solis et al., 2004), and previous work showing that deaf 
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children in oral education environments eventually “catch up” to hearing counterparts 
(Shusterman, et al., 2012), no difference was expected between groups. 
2.5.3.2 Working Memory 
 As of yet, there is not enough research on working memory in homesigners (or a 
similar group) to provide a prediction of the base rate of success. Given previous 
suggestions that Working Memory is a necessary ability for the success of False Belief 
tasks (Gibson, 1998), it was possible that the same would hold true in this study, on the 
other hand, other studies find no contribution of Working Memory above and beyond that 
of language to the success of False Belief (Astington & Jenkins, 1999, Slade, 2005).  
Given that homesigners have no language model or linguistic community, it was then 
possible that they could actually benefit from a contribution from Working Memory 
without the aforementioned influences of language on False Belief success. 
3: Study 1: Perspective Taking 
3.1: Introduction 
As we consider how crucial having a mature Theory of Mind is to everyday social 
interaction, it becomes clear that this is not an ability which develops quickly, or even at 
a specified age, but rather over time. There are important steps along a developmental 
continuum that build up to a mature understanding of others’ thoughts, beliefs and 
desires. Many take the understanding of False Belief (the understanding that someone can 
have a belief about the world which is untrue, given one’s own understanding and/or 
reality) to be the key measure of Theory of Mind development, but in order to understand 
that another can have a false belief, one must understand that others have beliefs, or at 
least experiences of the world which are different than one’s own. 
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 In his seminal work, Piaget (1956) showed that it was not until middle to late 
childhood that children could pass his “mountain task,” in which a child is presented with 
a 3D display of three mountains of varying heights and distances from the child.  The 
child was asked what the view would look like from differing points around the display. 
Piaget concluded that children could not understand others’ perspectives (and by relation, 
others’ minds) until middle to late childhood (Flavell, 1985). 
 Masangkay and his colleagues (1974) extended Piaget’s work showing that if the 
task is simplified by using two-dimensional pictures or single familiar 3D objects, 
preschool children can succeed. Masangkay et al.’s work shows that the understanding 
that others may see things that one cannot see themselves (Perspective Taking Level 1), 
and that the understanding that another’s view of the same object may not be the same as 
one’s own (Perspective Taking Level 2) is available to children much earlier than 
previously argued by Piaget. Flavell and colleagues (1981) further defined this ability to 
show that Level 1 understanding is developmentally prior to Level 2, and that the 
distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 cannot be easily overcome by training; that is, 
the progression to Level 2 is not trivial in that training does not help the child develop 
Level 2 understanding. 
 By placing Perspective Taking abilities on a developmental timeline, we see its 
relation to other abilities related to the understanding of others (Figure 1), and we also see 
that Perspective Taking is a developmentally earlier ability along the Theory of Mind 
developmental timeline. It is reasonable, then, to test Perspective Taking in our 
population of interest, to answer the question: Is the ability to understand another’s 
visual perspective language-dependent?  Perspective taking has not been tested directly 
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in deaf populations without cognitive impairments (see Shield (2010) for perspective 
taking in deaf children with Autism Spectrum Disorders). While it could be argued that 
previous work by Masangkay et al. (1974) and Flavell et al. (1981) show that children 
without mature language abilities11 can take others’ perspectives, these children still had 
years of language exposure which may have provided them with enough information 
about the world and others’ perspectives to scaffold the development of perspective. 
 Deaf individuals with no language exposure, but sufficient life experience provide 
us with a way to control for language as the key factor in the understanding of others’ 
perspectives. As an additional element, unschooled hearing Spanish speaking adults and 
children were tested to be sure that Socio-Economic Status (SES) and/or educational 
experiences were not contributing to success on this task, since the children in 
Masangkay et al. (1974) and Flavell et al. (1981) were all from middle class families and 
oftentimes were recruited from nursery schools.  
3.2: Participants 
 All participants were Nicaraguan: 7 deaf Homesigners (4 adults (HS); Mage= 
31.5y, Range = 26-35y and 3 adolescents (HS-A) Mage= 11.3y, Range = 10-12y), 6 deaf 
signers from Cohort 1 (Mage = 41y, Range = 35- 45y), representing NSL’s earliest users 
(NSL Signers), and 7 hearing Unschooled Spanish Speakers  (5 adults (USS); Mage= 
28.5y, Range = 19-39y and 2 adolescents (USS-A) Mage= 12.5y, Range = 12-16y). The 
Unschooled Spanish Speaking adults and adolescents represented a group who, like 
homesigners, had little to no education, but who, like the NSL signers, were part of a 
linguistic community (Table 1). 
                                                            
11 Assuming that mature language abilities are defined by mature discourse abilities, such as 
narrative coherence or cohesion (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith, 1985), which have been found to mature 
by about the age of 8 or 9 years old.  
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3.3: Materials and Procedure 
 Perspective-taking abilities were tested using two tasks, a two-dimensional, or 
“Level 1” task, and a 3-dimensional, or “Level 2” task (see Masangkay et al. (1974) or 
Flavell et al. (1981) for evidence for two developmentally distinct abilities).  
3.3.1 Level 1 perspective taking.  
Level 1 perspective taking abilities were tested using two-dimensional stimuli, 
namely two images printed on 8” x 11” laminated sheets, which were placed back-to-
back. First, both images were shown to the participants, and participants were asked to 
identify the objects (Figure 3). This was done for two reasons – first, it familiarized the 
participants with the images, and second, it created common references between the 
participant and the experimenter. This was particularly important because homesigners 
each have their own idiosyncratic means of communication, and the experimenter may 
not be familiar with their reference for “wheelbarrow,” for example.  
All the images chosen were familiar items in Nicaragua, varying in nature from 
humans to animals to inanimate tools.  All the images have previously been successful in 
Nicaragua, as these images represent a subset of images used in Richie et al.’s (2014) 
lexicon elicitation task. 
Four sets of images were presented: Cat/Hat, Wheelbarrow/Fishing Rod, 
Cow/Girl, and Pitcher/Chicken. For each of the aforementioned sets, after familiarization 
and naming of the images, one image was presented to the participant and the other faced 
the experimenter.  The experimenter then asked:  “What do you see?” and “What do I 
[the experimenter] see?” (see Table 2 and Figures 2–3). Both perspective questions were 






Question Anticipated Response 
Cat Hat What do you see? Hat 
Cat Hat What do I see? Cat 
** Images are then switched** 
Hat Cat What do I see? Hat 
Hat Cat What do you see? Cat 
Table 2: Sample interaction for Cat/Hat.  Crucial perspective questions are presented in bold text. 
 
            





Figure 3:  Experimenter and participant engaged in Perspective Taking Level 1 task. 
 
see every image (Table 2). Feedback was only provided during the first pair of images, 
Cat-Hat, if needed, to clarify the instructions. 
3.3.2 Level 2 perspective-taking.  
Level 2 perspective-taking abilities were tested using three-dimensional stimuli, 
namely three familiar objects: a toy duck, a mug with identifiable sides (a hand design on 
one side and a handle), and a toy truck (Figure 4).  Each object was presented to the 
participant on a “lazy susan” so that it could be rotated easily either by the experimenter 
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or the participant. Testing was done with the lazy susan on a surface between the 
participant and the experimenter12. Front/back perspectives were tested first with all 
objects, then side views were tested.  Like in Level 1, participants were asked “What do 
you see?” and “What do I [the experimenter] see?” (Table 3 and Figure 5). Participants 
were presented with an 8” x 11” laminated sheet displaying the four possible perspectives 
of the object being tested (Figure 5). Participants could respond either by selecting the 
correct image or by describing the correct perspective (e.g., “You see the back of the 
duck” or “You see the duck’s feet.”), however the experimenter encouraged the 
participant to choose the correct image whenever possible for clarity in coding and for 
consistency across participant groups, particularly for the homesigners, who may solely 
rely on selecting images. The experimenter re-asked the question for insufficiently 
descriptive responses such as “You see the duck.” The duck object was used for 
familiarization with the task, and feedback and practice were employed if the participant 
seemed to have trouble with the task. Strategies for explaining the task included 
 
Figure 4: The three objects tested in Perspective Taking Level 2: Duck, Mug, and Truck. 
                                                            
12 In some testing situations, the camera positioning and seating arrangements were such that the 
experimenter could sit “across” from the participant (they faced each other), but the table for the 
task was not between them (i.e., the experimenter and the participant sat on the same side of a 
large round table, but turned to face each other and positioned the task items on an area of the 
table between them (Figure 6)). 
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Figure 5: Sample answer array, and the four perspectives tested in Perspective Taking Level 2. 
Experimenter sees Participant sees Question Anticipated Response 
Back of duck  Front of duck  What do you see? Front of duck  
Back of duck  Front of duck  What do I see? Back of duck  
** Object is then rotated 180 degrees** 
Front of duck  Back of duck  What do I see? Front of duck  
Front of duck  Back of duck  What do you see? Back of duck  
Table 3: Sample interaction for Front/Back trials of object: duck.  Crucial perspective questions are presented 
in bold text. 
 
Figure 6. Images of participants engaged in "duck" trial. 
 
switching seats with the participant, either the experimenter or the participant rotating the 
object on the lazy susan, and the experimenter describing what she sees and asking the 
participant to find that picture in the array.  
3.4: Results 
The Level 1 Perspective Taking (two-dimensional images) trials were coded for 
correct responses: Wheelbarrow/Fishing Rod, Cow/Girl, and Pitcher/Chicken (practice 
trials were excluded). Only the first response was coded for accuracy, unless the 
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participant immediately corrected him/herself, for a total of three possible correct 
answers to the experimenter’s perspective. 
All participants scored at 100 percent accuracy for all Level 1 Perspective-Taking 
trials and thus no differences were found between participant groups, or as an effect of 
either age of language exposure or years of educational experiences. 
Level 2 Perspective Taking (three-dimensional objects) was coded for accuracy 
across non-practice trials (Mug and Truck). The front/back perspective trials were tested 
and coded separately from the side-view perspectives, for a total of four possible correct 
answers each (a total of eight possible correct across all front/back and side-view).  Only 
the first response for the experimenter’s perspective was coded for accuracy, unless the 
participant immediately corrected him/herself. 
Spearman’s correlations were conducted to assess the association between years 
without exposure to language and score on the Perspective Taking task (Figures 7 – 10).  
Years without exposure to language was measured as current age for the Homesigners 
(Mage=22.85, range= 10-35y), as they have not yet been exposed to a formal linguistic 
system. The age of entry into the schooling system for the Cohort 1 signers (Mage-of-entry = 
4.76) was considered to be their number of years without a language, and this value was 
zero for the Unschooled Spanish Speakers, as they were exposed to a fully developed 
linguistic system from birth. 
No relationship was found between lack of exposure to language and score on 
Level 2 Perspective taking for either front/back or side-view trials (Front/Back rs[18] = -
0.36, p = 0.11; Side-View rs[18] = -0.14, p = 0.53, Figures 7 and 8).  
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The second question at hand is whether experience in educational settings may have an 
impact on Perspective Taking abilities. As mentioned, most of the participants in 
previous studies (Masangkay et al., 1974, Flavell et al., 1981) who were able to succeed 
on Perspective Taking Level 2 tasks were recruited from educational programs (local 
nursery schools).  While language may not be a key factor in developing Perspective 
Taking skills, it could have been that the structured environment and types of interactions 
available (the types and number of conversations with peers) may scaffold these abilities. 
 
 
Figure 7: Perspective Taking of 3D objects - Front/Back perspective.  Number of years without exposure to a 
language was not associated with scores on Front/Back 3D objects. 
 
 
Figure 8: Perspective Taking of 3D objects - Side View.  Number of years without exposure to a language was 
not associated with perspective taking ability of 3D objects - side view. 
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In our populations, however, educational experiences did not predict Perspective 
Taking Level 2 abilities for either the Front/Back perspectives or the Side-view 
perspectives (Front/Back rs[18] = -0.34, p = 0.14; Side-View rs[18] = 0.22, p = 0.33, 




Figure 9: Perspective Taking of 3D objects - Front/Back perspective.  Number of years of education was not 
associated with scores on Perspective Taking Front/Back tasks. 
 
 
Figure 10: Perspective Taking of 3D objects - Side view.  Number of years of education was not associated with 




 The results show that both Level 1 and Level 2 Perspective Taking abilities are 
available regardless of exposure to a language or educational experiences. Under either 
condition, participants show that they understand that another individual can see things 
that they themselves cannot (Level 1), and that perspectives of objects simultaneously 
visible to themselves and others may nonetheless give rise to differing visual experiences 
(Level 2) (Flavell et al. 1981). In fact, for many participants in Level 1 and some in Level 
2, the task was easy enough that participants often volunteered the Experimenter’s 
perspective before the Experimenter could ask the question. 
 It is still clear, however, that Level 2 is harder than Level 1, given the fact that all 
participants scored perfectly on Level 1 but not on Level 2.  This difficulty, however, 
doesn’t seem to relate systematically to either language exposure or education. 
 So what do we make of the individuals who scored poorly on Level 2?  First, we 
could consider a comparison of scores to chance-- for Level 2, chance performance is 
25% (1/4 of the available perspective options: Front, back, Left side, Right side). Given 
this cutoff, only one participant scored below chance levels, although others hover around 
chance (three for side view: two homesigners and one NSL signer, and two on front/back, 
both homesigners).  It is notable that the USS participants, while they did not score 
perfectly, were also not scoring as close to chance as these homesigners and NSL signer 
did. 
 This pattern of data might be also be interpreted as evidence of two distinct 
abilities: first, the understanding that another’s experience or perspective may be 
different from your own, and second, the ability to mentalize, or actually take the other’s 
 32 
perspective. Even if the participant is incorrect in his or her prediction, the fact that they 
do not choose their own perspective seems to constitute evidence that an individual 
understands that another person has a different perspective from their own.  
 A post—hoc review of incorrect answers revealed that for the Front/Back 
perspective, 4 out of 7 homesigners, 3 of 6 NSL signers and 2 of 6 Unschooled Spanish 
Speaking (adults and children) consistently chose the picture that corresponded to their 
own perspective when they were asked about the experimenter’s perspective, instead of 
one of the other perspectives (Side-view-Left or Side-view-Right). This pattern possibly 
sugggests that participants who answered in this way may have had a hard time even 
realizing that the experimenter had a different perspective from their own.  However, the 
Side-view perspective results offer a more interesting interpretation.  While the adult 
homesigners did not solely choose their own perspective as their (incorrect) answer in the 
side-view tasks, the (incorrect) answers they chose were always of the front of the item.  
This was also the case for only one NSL signer.  The rest of the NSL signers’ incorrect 
responses for the side-view were of their own perspective. It could be, perhaps, that in 
lieu of a good strategy for mentalizing another’s perspective, the default could be to go 
for the “iconic” or forward-facing image of the object.  The data here are too small to run 
statistical analyses—recall that this breakdown is of the incorrect choices: the responses 
that are left after first removing the correct choices from what was a small sample to 
begin with.  Further work could investigate the question of the makeup of incorrect 
choices using a larger sample size. 
 Poor overall performance on Level 2 could also be accounted for by the difficulty 
that some participants may have had in understanding the task in the first place. While a 
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variety of strategies for explaining the task were employed, the experimenter’s strategy of 
getting up and switching seats with the participant to demonstrate different perspectives 
was concentrated entirely within the deaf participant groups (Homesigners and NSL 
cohort 1 signers), although it was not used with every deaf participant.  This could mean 
that deaf participants genuinely had a harder time understanding the task, but it also could 
mean that the experimenter found this to be the most efficient means of explaining the 
task.  Further analysis of the videos is required to evaluate these possibilities. 
 Interestingly, for the Unschooled Spanish Speakers, novel means of solving the 
perspective questions arose. One particularly striking strategy was to talk through one’s 
own perspective and therefore conclude the experimenter’s.  A paraphrased (and 
interpreted) solution to the Truck (side-view) question is as follows:  “Hmm.  I see the 
driver’s side here, so you must be looking at the passenger side, and the passenger’s side 
[picture] is here.”  Obviously language helped this participant in some way – language 
allowed him to hold in memory labels for each side (“driver’s” vs. “passenger’s” side) 
and then allowed him to articulate that before depending on the answer array for possible 
perspectives. 
 Another interesting linguistic, or communicative, note is that oftentimes sign 
language verbs expressing seeing are “directional verbs,” that is, they can be modified to 
encode the object that is being seen (Sandler & Lillo Martin, 2006). Thus, it could be said 
that in the gestural or linguistic question posed by the experimenter, the experimenter 
could be unintentionally indicating the “answer” by indicating the side of the object 
closest to her either using a directional verb (“see X” or by pointing as part of the gestural 
question “What do I see?”, and therefore, what her perspective is. If this were the case, 
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however, one would assume that the signers or homesigners would have some sort of an 
advantage in this task, which does not seem to be the case. 
 In sum, we see that Perspective Taking Skills are available to individuals 
regardless of their language background or educational experiences, but also that neither 
kind of experience guarantees success on this task. What should we make of the life 
experiences of individuals who do not succeed on Perspective Taking Level 2?  Are they 
limited to the Perspective Taking Skills of a 2 – 3 year old typically developing child? It 
is more likely that the understanding exists, without the ability to actually mentalize the 
other perspective. Further investigations would need to be conducted (perhaps the same 
task but with more participants) to identify factors relating to success in Perspective 
Taking Level 2 for understanding vs. mentalization as well as to factor out other 
contributing factors. 
4. Study 2: False Belief  
4.1 Introduction 
 Over the last two decades, studies have shown that it is not the experience of 
being deaf itself, but the consequent delay in language exposure that causes a “delay” in 
the deaf child’s ability to succeed at False Belief tasks (Courtin & Melot, 2005, Meristo 
et al., 2012, Moeller & Schick, 2006, Morgan & Kegl, 2006, Peterson, 1999, Rhys-Jones 
& Ellis, 2000, Schick et al., 2007, Woolfe et al., 2000,).  What these studies have shown 
is that ToM abilities are delayed commensurate with the degree of delay in sign language 
exposure. But what if the child is never exposed to a language? Does ToM never progress 
past a certain point? This thesis takes as its central question the following: Can life 
experiences apart from language, or visuo-social experiences, provide enough 
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information about others’ thoughts, beliefs and desires to scaffold ToM development 
without the need for linguistic input? 
 This study is designed to complement previous work in Nicaragua (Pyers, 2005, 
Pyers & Senghas, 2009) by extending the populations studied to those who have had no 
exposure to signed or spoken language.  Pyers (2005) and Pyers & Senghas (2009) 
worked with Nicaraguan signers, showing that the older members of the community 
(Cohort 1) who had no language models (no vertical transmission) but who had rich peer-
to-peer linguistic experience (rich horizontal transmission) (Senghas et al., 2005) 
performed worse on a false belief task than the next cohort of signers (Cohort 2). Note 
that Cohort 2 signers had Cohort 1 as their language models; horizontal peer-to-peer 
interactions and their young age allowed them to surpass the language vertically 
transmitted to them through their interactions with Cohort 1 signers (their older peers). 
 Cohort 1, however, was not completely incapable of passing the FB tasks.  They 
were less able to do so, and were more likely to pass Appearance /Reality FB tasks (4/8 
participants) than to pass Unexpected Contents FB tasks (0/8 participants) (Pyers, 2005).  
Could it be that some aspects of FB understanding (such as the understanding about 
Appearance-Reality) are more readily available through social/ life experiences? 
 The goal of this study is to investigate the possible contributions of social 
experience to the development of ToM. Hearing, Spanish-speaking participants with little 
to no schooling are included as a comparison group to Cohort 1, who have experience 
both in a linguistic community and with educational settings. 
4.2: Participants 
The participants were the adult participants from Study 1, with one additional 
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Unschooled Spanish speaking adult. All participants were Nicaraguan: 4 Homesigners 
(HS), 6 signers from Cohort 1, representing NSL’s earliest users (NSL Signers), and 6 
Unschooled Spanish Speakers who, like homesigners, had little to no education, but who, 
like the NSL signers, were part of a linguistic community (Table 1).  
4.3 Materials and Procedure 
In traditional FB tasks experimenters provide task instructions, content, and 
prompts using language, and participants respond verbally. Thus, a truly non-verbal FB 
task was needed to avoid any in-task linguistic requirements. Additionally, alternative FB 
tasks which are usually deemed “non-verbal” still have elements which require 
experience with activities typical of middle-class homes and educational contexts. For 
example, the picture-completion task used with NSL signers in Pyers & Senghas (2009) 
was not successful with Nicaraguan homesigners, and may also present issues for 
unschooled hearing Nicaraguans, who similarly may not appreciate the convention of 
sequentially presented still images representing continuous events in a narrative (as in 
storybooks). In our design, we strove to eliminate language from both the task 
instructions and task demands, and therefore used an experiential FB task adapted from 
Pyers (2005), described below. 
Each participant was given first-hand experience with Appearance-Reality (A/R) 
and Unexpected Contents (UC) false belief situations. They then participated in a 
prediction game in which they earned money for making correct predictions. The 
procedure is described in great detail because the incremental, implicit understanding of 
the task instructions, and how participants should respond, are essential to our 
commitment to a minimally verbal procedure that fairly assesses the theory of mind 
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abilities of homesigners in particular. Table 4 summarizes the three phases and 14 trials 
that each participant saw, first for the experience, then again for the prediction condition. 
4.3.1.  Phase 1: Stickers:  
The goal of Phase 1 was twofold. The experience condition familiarized 
participants with the process of choosing items from an array, and (nonverbally) 
demonstrated that a choice on a particular trial may be obvious (such as in an array of 
three originally identical stickers, one pristine, and the other two crumpled or ripped), or 
a choice might be based on preference (e.g., two different-colored smiley face stickers). 
In the prediction condition, the sticker phase provided the understanding that: 1) 
sometimes it is easy to predict someone else’s behavior (obvious choice trials), 2) 
sometimes it is hard (individual preference trials), and 3) correct predictions earn them a 
small monetary reward (5 Córdobas per correct prediction (max. 70 Córdobas or 
US$2.75) across all trials (a healthy incentive given typical local incomes13). 
4.3.2 Phase 2: Appearance/ Reality 
In the Appearance/Reality phase, the participant saw three plates holding 1, 2, and 
4 cookies. Unbeknownst to the participant, the four “cookies” were very convincing 
ceramic composite replicas. The experimenter encouraged each participant to indicate the 
“best” plate. For the homesigners, this was done by pointing at the participant, and then 
to the three plates of cookies, followed by a thumbs-up gesture with a questioning look. 
All participants chose the plate with four cookies during their experience phase; when 
encouraged to try a cookie, they discovered that the cookies were not real. The cookies 
were returned to their original array and the question or gestures were repeated, this time 
                                                            
13 This monetary incentive was approved under University of Connecticut IRB # H10-306. 
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to test the participant’s knowledge that the cookies were fake (thus the plate with 2 
cookies should be chosen as the “best”). 
4.3.3 Phase 3: Unexpected Contents:  
In the Unexpected Contents condition, the participant was presented with one of 
two arrays: paper, a glass, a lock, and a candle or a notebook, a mug, a lockbox and a box 
of cigarettes (Table 4). The participant was then presented with a series of tools and was 
asked to indicate which object in the array each tool is used with. First, the participant 
was presented with a pen, and had to match it with an object (paper or notebook). Upon 
choosing the paper, the participant was asked to make a mark on the paper. The 
participant was then presented with a pitcher of water and asked to match it to an object 
(the glass or mug). Upon choosing, the participant was asked to pour water into the 
vessel. Third, the participant was presented with the matchbox (containing a key, but no 
matches), and again asked to match it to an object (in the False Belief trial, the participant 
should choose the candle or cigarettes, but in the knowledge trial, the participant should 
know that the matchbox contains a key and choose the lock or lockbox). Upon choosing 
the candle or cigarettes, the participant was encouraged to light the candle or a cigarette, 
and subsequently discovered that the matchbox contained a key, not matches. The array 
was then switched (i.e., paper to notebook, etc.) but the three tools (pen, pitcher, and 
matchbox) were left in view of the participant, so he or she could see that no one, 
including the experimenter, touched them. The entirety of the Unexpected Contents 
condition was repeated, now with the participant knowing what was in the matchbox, 
matching tools to their objects.  Note, the key trial is the matchbox trial, during which the 
participant should demonstrate his or her knowledge that the matchbox contained a key 
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(instead of matches), and thus should be matched with the lock/lockbox, not the 
candle/cigarettes. In the prediction phase (i.e., when the participant is predicting the 
choices of a confederate), the first two tools (pen, pitcher of water) set the participant up 
for the tool-matching paradigm, while the third (matchbox containing a key) presented 
first a false belief, then a test of knowledge. 
 
Figure 11: Participant engaged in the experiencer phase of the False Belief task. 
 
 
Figure 12: Participant engaged in the Predictor phase of the False Belief task. 
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Table 4: The phases and individual trials that each participant saw, once as an experiencer and then once as a 
predictor of a confederate's choices.  All relevant ordering possibilities were counterbalanced. 
To reiterate, after experiencing the entire task, and more importantly, directly 
experiencing the false beliefs, each participant participated in all trials again, but this time 
as a predictor of another’s choices (Figure 12) – a confederate who was a member of the 
research team but who had not previously participated in any aspect of this task. The 
participant indicated the item the confederate would choose, before the confederate 
actually made a selection, by marking a set of laminated sheets containing images of all 
the arrays. 
4.4 Results 
A participant had to correctly predict the confederate’s choices in both the 
Appearance/ Reality and Unexpected Contents conditions to pass the task overall (see 
Figure 13), light and dark red bars, for proportion of participants passing each subtest). 
For the Appearance/ Reality condition, a participant passed if they predicted that the 
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confederate would choose the plate with 4 (fake) cookies; participants failed this task if 
they predicted that the confederate would choose the plate with two cookies. For the 
Unexpected Contents condition, a participant passed if they predicted that the confederate 
would match the matchbox to the item to be lit (i.e., the cigarettes or the candle), and 
failed if they predicted that the confederate matched the matchbox to the item that needed 
a key (i.e., the lock or the lockbox). None of the Homesigners, who lack a linguistic 
community, passed; however, immersion in a linguistic community did not guarantee 
passing for NSL signers and Unschooled Spanish Speakers.  In sum, for Appearance/ 
Reality, no homesigner passed, 3 out of 6 NSL signers passed (50%), and 4 out of 6 of 
the Unschooled Spanish Speakers passed (67%).  For Unexpected Contents, no 
homesigner passed, 1 out of 6 NSL signers passed (16%), and 3 out of 6 Unschooled 
Spanish Speakers passed (50%) (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13: Proportion of each group that passed each task.  No participant passed the Unexpected Contents 
condition without also passing Appearance/Reality, thus the scores for Unexpected Contents were the same as 
passing the task overall. 
Despite the difficulty that some of the Spanish speakers had with the task, the 
Spearman’s rho revealed a significant inverse relationship between the amount of time an 
individual lacked a linguistic community and Appearance Reality score (rs[14] = -0.51, p 
= 0.038) and Unexpected Contents score (rs[14] = -.48, p = 0.049). The Spearman’s rho 
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failed to reveal a statistically significant relationship between education and either FB 
task (Appearance /Reality: rs[14] = .11, p = .680; Unexpected Contents: (rs[14] = .06, p = 
0.813). 
To increase our understanding of the relationship between language, social 
experiences, education and False Belief understanding, participants were given scores of 
0, 1, or 2, depending on whether they passed none, one, or both False Belief phases 
respectively.  This was their overall score. Years without a linguistic community 
significantly related to overall scores (rs[14] = -.56, p = 0.024), but years of educational 
experience was not (rs[14] = 0.06, p = 0.829) (Figures 14 and 15). 
 
 


































Figure 15: Years of educational experience was not related to overall False Belief scores. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Effects of linguistic community and education 
In sum, as strength of linguistic community increased (with Homesigners having 
the weakest, and hearing Nicaraguans the strongest), the passing rate for both conditions 
of the False Belief task increased significantly. Notably, hearing Nicaraguans did not 
universally pass either task, in conflict with the prediction that membership in a linguistic 
community (and consequent exposure from birth to an established language) would 
enable passing.  These results not only demonstrate a positive relationship between 
participation in a linguistic community and success on the FB task; they also refute the 
Simulation Theorists’ position (e.g., Goldman, 1992, Gordon, 1986) that life experiences 
are enough to promote understanding of others’ beliefs. If it were the case that life 
experiences were sufficient, as they argue, then all three groups (including the 




















It is also notable that typically developing, hearing, American five- year-olds 
usually pass what would be considered more linguistically complex False Belief tasks.  
While some variation exists cross-culturally, cross-linguistically, and across varied 
socioeconomic backgrounds (Chasiotis et al., 2006, Cicchetti  et al., 2003, Liu et al, 2008, 
Noble et al., 2005, Shahaeian, 2014, Shatz et al., 2003, Slaughter & Perez-Zapata, 2014) 
in the average age of passing these types of false belief, with the upper age limit of about 
9 years old for some linguistic groups (e.g., Slaughter & Perez-Zapata, 2014), we note 
that the children in these studies do eventually pass sometime in childhood, and their 
struggles with the False Belief task do not persist into adolescence. Specifically, these 
children are younger than the participants in this study14 and therefore presumably have 
less life experience to draw from than do the homesigners. All of the children studied 
across these cultures, however, do have the benefit of participation in a linguistic 
community plus the benefit of (some) educational experience, usually.  
 While education did not predict passing rates for our participant groups, it is 
likely that education level and language interact for typically developing American 
children, as well as for the current participants. This is suggested by the fact that the four 
individuals who passed both tasks (who received an overall score of “2” – one NSL 
signer and three Spanish speakers) have certain traits that either give them an advantage 
linguistically or “educationally.”  More specifically, the one NSL signer who scored a 
“2” represents the youngest of his cohort of signers. He spends a lot of time with 
members of the next cohort (Cohort 2, who uses a more grammatically complex form of 
NSL than Cohort 1 does (e.g., Senghas, 2003, Senghas et al., 2004, 2005) and is likely to 
                                                            
14  With the exception of one nine-year-old adolescent participant who did not participate in the 
False Belief task, but contributed to the Perspective Taking and Executive Function tasks. 
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have access15 to the mental state language that Cohort 2 uses more often than Cohort 1 
members would (Pyers & Senghas, 2009). Therefore, he has a boost of the linguistic 
kind. The three Spanish speakers, however, who had full and early access to a linguistic 
community, but who did not have formal education are nevertheless “leaders” – two are 
the equivalent of foremen on their farms and the third is a small business owner.  While 
we cannot disambiguate whether, for instance, these individuals already had some sort of 
skills that led them to become the leaders they are now, or whether being put in the 
position of being a leader helped them develop these ToM abilities. 
Finally, it is also of note that the passing rates differed for Appearance /Reality 
and Unexpected Contents, suggesting that these subtasks tap different aspects of False 
Belief understanding, as previously suggested by Pyers (2005). 
4.5.2. Ensuring comprehension of the task 
We can be confident that participants, including the homesigners, understood the 
FB task based on its design and from the research team’s years of experience working 
with these individuals on a variety of language and cognitive tasks. Unlike traditional FB 
tasks, the current task instructs via experience rather than verbally - while language was 
used for those who had it, it was not the key testing factor – no predictions had to be put 
in the form of a sentence and the experiences spoke for themselves: the task phases gave 
participants experiences prior to making predictions– the very experiences that a 
Simulation Theorist would expect to scaffold predictions about another’s choices. 
The sticker phase provided the experience of making easy vs. hard (preference) 
choices, and then participants experienced earning or not earning incentives for correct 
                                                            
15 These materials unfortunately did not elicit sufficient mental state language to evaluate the 
association between the production of mental state terms and False Belief success. 
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predictions. An additional control is built into the Unexpected Contents phase: a correct 
prediction of candle/cigarettes (for the matchbox) could come about in three ways: 1) the 
participant actually understood the other person’s FB; 2) they forgot what was actually in 
the box and were just responding based on appearances (the matchbox calls for the 
candle), or 3) they didn’t understand the task, and simply answered on the basis of the 
appearance of the box. However, in our dataset, whenever a participant did not succeed, 
they erroneously predicted the lock/lockbox to be the item that the matchbox calls for, 
thus showing that they 1) remembered what was in the matchbox (a key) and assumed 
that the confederate also must know that there is a key in the matchbox.  Again, this is 
evidence that they had not forgotten what was in the box and were actually trying to 
predict the tool match (as opposed to choosing some other object in the array because 
they didn’t understand the task). Moreover, the homesigners never indicated that they 
thought they were being fooled. To ensure trust, items for the FB task were never moved 
from the participant’s sight. 
In sum, the task design ensures that participants understood the task because it (1) 
instructs via experience rather than language; (2) gives participants experiences before 
making predictions; (3) includes training items for easy vs. hard (preference) choices; (4) 
builds in memory checks; and (5) provides monetary incentives for correct predictions.   
Regardless of how well individual participants comprehended the task, no participant 
group universally passed, showing that no factor (education, participation in a linguistic 
community, or life/ social experiences) guarantees passing.  Overall, the best predictor of 
success on the task was participation in a linguistic community, and life experiences were 
shown (by the homesigners’ failure to pass either FB phase) to not scaffold FB success. 
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5. Studies 3 and 4: Executive Function 
5.1 Introduction 
When studying the development of Theory of Mind abilities we should consider 
not only the relative contributions of language experience and social experiences, but also 
executive functioning abilities (which also may be influenced by life experiences such as 
social or linguistic input) (see section 1.3 for a definition and discussion of the Executive 
Functions).  
Two executive function (EF) skills in particular have been tested as part of the 
current research program.  The first EF study investigates Inhibitory Control (IC), the 
ability to inhibit one piece of information or rule, in favor of another, and the second 
investigates Working Memory (WM), or the ability to encode information and later 
transform that information for one's use and their respective relations to language and 
education. To our knowledge this study is the first to investigate EF abilities in these 
groups. 
Both IC and WM have been hypothesized to lend a hand in ToM development 
(particularly for the FB task) for seemingly obvious reasons. First, WM allows us to 
encode the information of the reality of the situation and/or what we believe to be true, 
and the transformational aspect of WM allows us to update our knowledge as we learn 
what we may have thought to be true to not be true (the realization of our own false 
belief), and to encode the new reality (Carlson et al, 2002). IC then provides us with the 
ability to suppress what we now know to be true in favor what must be true for another 
individual given their reality. This goes beyond simply understanding that others have 
their own thoughts and beliefs to a level of processing that then can imagine, or mentalize 
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the other’s reality and predict behavior according to one’s own assumptions of that other 
person’s reality. 
5.2 Study 3: Inhibitory Control 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Inhibitory Control (IC) Executive Functioning abilities were tested in our 
populations using a simple mixed congruent/incongruent task adapted from Shusterman 
et al. (2012) that required minimal verbal instruction and required only a behavioral 
response (vs. a verbal response). This task was chosen because it has been used with 
young deaf populations in the United States, and because the conflict of rules parallels a 
FB trial: one must suppress one rule (or truth) for another.  
This study aims to answer the following question: Is the ability to inhibit one 
rule in favor of another, and more specifically, is the ability to switch between rules 
dependent on one’s language experience or educational experiences? 
5.2.2 Participants 
All participants were the same as in Study 1: Perspective Taking. 
5.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
The experimenter sat across from the participant, with two 6”-diameter light-
buttons on the table between them (Figure 14). In the instruction portion, the 
experimenter donned a black or white glove on her right hand and gesturally or verbally 
instructed the participant that when she tapped a button with that hand, the participant 
was to tap the same button. This was demonstrated for each of the two buttons.   The 
participant then received two more practice trials with feedback, one for each of the 
buttons. The experiment had three testing phases (Table 5): 1) Right hand; 2) Left hand; 
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3) Both hands (Figure 14). In the first testing phase, the experimenter tapped the buttons 
with her right hand in a prescribed pattern (3 times on the left, 3 times on the right, 6 
times total), and the participant had to tap the same button as the experimenter each time. 
In phase 2, a new rule was introduced, and the experimenter used her left hand 
instead of her right hand. The left hand “rule” was that whichever button was tapped, the 
participant had to tap the other button. Laterality of glove color was counterbalanced 
across participants (i.e., if the right hand had had a black glove in phase 1, then the left 
hand had the white glove). A few practice trials with feedback were followed by 6 test 
trials, as in phase 1. 
In the third phase both gloved hands (one black and one white), tapped the 
buttons (Figure 16). Both rules from phase 1 and phase 2 continued to apply: when the 
right hand tapped a button, the participant still had to tap the same button; likewise, when 
the left hand tapped a button, the participant had to tap the other button. Note that the 
glove color/ hand did not change from the control phases. Phase 3 contained 12 trials, 
with four possible hand/button combinations. All participants, including the homesigners, 
clearly understood the rules (see results for Phases 1 and 2 below); in fact, homesigners 
enjoyed the task so much that they afterward donned the gloves themselves to play with 
others as a diversion. 
 
Figure 16:  Participant receiving gestural instructions for Phase 3 of the Inhibitory Control task. 
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Table 5: The three phases of the Inhibitory Control task, along with the glove color and task rule(s). 
5.2.4 Results 
All participants scored well above chance (50%) on control phases 1 and 2 (right 
& left hands alone, with a switch in between), (Homesigners’ mean =90%, NSL Cohort 1 
signers’ mean =95%, Unschooled Spanish Speakers’ mean =86%), showing they 
understood the task. The phase of interest is the third phase, which required the 
participants to maintain two conflicting instructions – to either tap the same or the other 
button, depending on the hand being used/glove color.  
 
 
Figure 17: Years without a language was not associated with success on the Inhibitory Control task (rs[18] = 




Figure 18: Years of educational experience was significantly associated with Inhibitory Control scores (rs[18] = 
0.54, p = 0.014).   
 
Figures 17 and 18 present individual IC scores as predicted by years without language 
exposure (Figure 17) or years of educational experience (Figure 18). Spearman’s 
nonparametric analyses showed no relationship between a delay in language exposure 
(years without a language) and IC score (rs[18] = 0.041, p = 0.86).  A significant 
relationship was found, however, between years of educational experiences and IC score 
(rs[18] = 0.54, p = 0.014). 
5.2.5 Discussion 
The fact that NSL Signers, the only group with significant educational 
experiences, tended to score higher than the other two groups, along with our significant 
regression results, strongly suggest that education plays a role in developing Inhibitory 
Control EF abilities. Somewhat surprisingly, early language exposure did not predict IC 
scores, suggesting that having a native language alone does not ensure success on this 

































comparing native signing deaf children and adults to those who acquired a sign language 
later in life (Contreras et al., 2013). It is most likely that an interaction exists between 
language and education for executive function abilities: the participants in previous 
studies all had educational experiences, but the participants with early language exposure 
were also most likely to have capitalized on their early educational experiences. Our 
design, however, cannot distinguish between membership in a language community 
combined with education and education alone.  
This is also contrary to previous results with unschooled adults from rural areas 
(Ostrosky-Solis et al., 2004) that showed that there were no EF differences between 
unschooled adults and those with educational experiences.  We must point out, however 
that it may be likely that their task was not sensitive enough to the type of Inhibitory-
control that was tested here. The task described in Ostrosky-Solis et al., (2004) parallels 
more with our phases 1 and 2, where there is a single switch of rules (e.g., right hand to 
left hand), and where the second rule is then maintained. Ostrosky-Solis (2004) do not 
describe any phase where the two rules alternate, or conflict. This Conflict-Inhibitory-
Control phase was the crucial phase in which we found differences between our groups, 
with Education resulting as the significant relation to IC abilities. 
In sum, a community language (even an emerging one) combined with moderate 
levels of education apparently enabled NSL Signers to pass at a higher rate than the other 
two groups. Notably, NSL Signers’ lack of a conventionalized language and the fact that 
their primary language was not even used in their classrooms did not prevent the majority 
of them from achieving criterion. 
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5.3. Study 4: Working Memory 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Previous work (e.g., Gordon & Olson, 1998, Carlson et al., 2002, a.o.) has 
suggested ties between EF abilities and ToM development. They suggest that ToM 
abilities must tap into other “computational resources” in order to make correct 
predictions about others’ beliefs or desires. One of these computational resources is one’s 
ability to encode information and later transform that information dependent on a task, 
known as Working Memory (WM) abilities. 
In this study, participants engaged in a visuospatial span task of short-term 
memory, known widely as the Corsi block-tapping task (CBT) (Kessels et al., 2000).  
While the Corsi block task is typically considered a span task, the reverse Corsi has been 
argued to be a better test of working memory rather than rote span memory (Eigsti, 2001) 
and thus more suited to the Working Memory needs of ToM (Gordon & Olson, 1998).  
This is because the participant must encode the original span, then “transform” the 
encoded memory in order to produce the same span in reverse. 
This CBT-like spatial memory span task was chosen over other working memory 
tasks because its spatial properties are well suited for nonverbal testing of populations 
such as homesigners and NSL signers, whose verbal skills (in either a sign or spoken 
language) may be compromised. 
This study aims to answer the following question: Is the ability to encode 





All participants were the same as for Study 1: Perspective Taking and Study 3: 
Inhibitory Control. 
5.3.3 Materials and Procedure 
Participants were tested using a Corsi-like block-tapping task that was created to 
match the format of other Corsi-like spatial memory span tasks. A thin, sturdy board, 
approximately ¼ inch in thickness was painted bright blue and then had nine 2”x2”x2” 
blocks affixed to it in a specified random pattern in which the spaces between the blocks 
varied in order to avoid any sort of visual pattern (Figure 17). The 2x2x2 blocks were 
painted white and had a number written on one side so that the experimenter could see 
them, but the participant could not (Figures 19 and 20).  
The block-tapping pattern was created by first randomizing numbers one through 
nine (1-9) fourteen times, and then selecting the first two numbers from the first 
randomized string for trial 1a, the first two numbers from the second randomized string 
for trial Forward 1b, the first three numbers from the third randomized string for trial 2a, 
and so on, through trial Forward 7b. Reverse trials were then created by (a) switching the 
order of trials within each block set, and then (b) reversing the order of taps within each 
trial. For example, Froward trial 1a consisted of tapping square number 6 then 7,  
 




Figure 20: Participant engaged in the Corsi Block Task. 
 
and Forward trial 1b consisted of tapping square number 1 then 2.  Reverse trial 1a 
consisted of square 2 then 1 and Reverse trial 1b consisted of square 7 then 6 (See 
Appendix B). 
Participants were tested in a quiet area with minimal distractions. The 
experimenter sat across from the participant with a table between them whenever possible 
(see footnote 10) and provided them with spoken (for Spanish speaking participants), 
signed (for Cohort 1 signers), or gestural (for Homesigners) instructions. As part of the 
instructions, the experimenter tapped two blocks in sequence and encouraged the 
participant to tap the same two blocks in the same sequence. Practice and reiteration of 
the instructions was permitted for any participant who struggled with this. The test 
proceeded when the participant tapped the correct two blocks in the correct sequence 
twice (both trials for the span of 2). The experimenter gauged the participant’s 
understanding at this point and provided feedback, reiteration, and more two-block 
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sequences if necessary. 
Once the task started, the experimenter proceeded through the next 14 trials of 
increasingly longer spans. Spans ranged from 2 blocks tapped to 9 blocks tapped.  No 
block was tapped twice in any sequence, and each span had two trials (i.e., two spans of 
two, two spans of three, two spans of four, etc.).  The tapping rate was about 1 second 
between each tap, with no longer pauses.  
Following the “Forward” span described above, the experimenter then explained 
(using the appropriate means of communication for the participant) that now the spans 
would be reversed – the experimenter would tap blocks and the participant was expected 
to tap the same blocks in reverse order. Again, the experimenter used the 2-span block to 
provide feedback, imitation, and instruction as needed to help the participant understand.  
The same strategies were employed as were described for the “forward” span. 
 All participants were tested for all spans; which deviates from the typical block 
tapping span protocol.  This was done for two reasons – first, the spans were not coded 
“live” as they usually are in the CBT – all block tapping tasks for this study were 
videotaped for later coding. Second, the experimenter was sensitive to the fact that 
participants may be aware of their failures on many tasks and did not want to give them 
the impression that they were “failing” by scoring them live and ending the task 
prematurely. Instead, the experimenter nodded for all spans (after the initial round of 
feedback/ correction/ practice) without indicating whether the participant had actually 
succeeded. 
Each participant received two scores for each of the forward and reverse span 
tasks, following the procedure outlined in Kessels et al. (2000) for the original CBT:  
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First they received a Span score, which indicates the longest correct span of blocks 
tapped within that task (forward or reverse), and second they received a Total score 
which is the product of the Span score and the number of correctly repeated sequences 
(Kessels et al., 2000). In the typical Corsi protocol, the test ends once the participant is 
unable to correctly repeat both sequences in any block.  For example, a participant (we’ll 
call him Participant A) could produce both sequences correctly in each of the blocks for 
spans 2 and 3, then one sequence correct in each of 4 and 5, and once he reaches the 
block for the span of 6, he incorrectly reproduces both the tapping sequences. At this 
point the experimenter in a typical protocol would have stopped the test. In our study, the 
experimenter continued the test through all blocks, but the scoring of the test followed the 
typical protocol in that once a participant incorrectly produces both sequences in a block, 
we have then found his or her “Span,” as if the test had stopped at that point.  This was 
done separately for “forward” and “reverse” tasks, given arguments that they do not 
necessarily test the same type of working memory (Eigsti, 2001). 
For Participant A above, this means he achieved a Span of 5 (longest correctly 
produced sequence), and correctly produced 6 sequences (2+2+1+1)16, which is then used 
to calculate his Total score of 30 (Span of 5 x 6 correct sequences).  Participant B, 
however, may also have a Span of 5 but may have struggled all along, having produced 
only 1 correct sequence per block (1+1+1+1 = 4 correct sequences). Her Total score 
would then be 20 (Span of 5 x 4 correct sequences). The Total score is therefore a better 
measure of the robustness of the participant’s ability at the task. 
 
                                                            
16 Note that because there is no “span” of 1, achieving a span of five means the participant has 
only participated in blocks of 2, 3, 4 and 5 spans. 
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5.3.4 Results 
Spearman’s correlations testing the relationship between educational experiences 
or years without a language and both forward and reverse span and score were 
conducted, for a total of 8 analyses. Years of education and years without a language 
were input for each participant as they were for the studies of Perspective Taking and 
Inhibitory Control. 
Forward memory span scores did not show any significant relationship with either 
years without a language (Span: rs[18] = 0.197, p = 0.40, Total score: rs[18] = 0.353, p = 
0.13), or educational experience (Span: rs[18] = -0.050, p = 0.83, Total score: rs[18] = 
0.015, p = 0.95).  
 
 





Figure 22: Years of life without language exposure did not predict forward memory span total scores. 
 
 




Figure 24: Years of educational experience did not predict forward memory span Total scores. 
 
Figure 25: Years without a language did not predict Reverse memory Spans. 
Likewise, reverse memory span scores for years without a language (Span: rs[18] 
= -0.272, p = 0.25, Total score: rs[18] = -0.42, p = 0.066) or Years of Education (Span: 
rs[18] = 0.171, p = 0.47, Total score: rs[18] = 0.176, p = 0.45) yielded no significant 






Figure 26: Years without exposure to a language did not predict Reverse memory span Total scores. 
 
 




Figure 28: Years of educational experience did not predict Reverse memory span Total Scores. 
5.3.5 Discussion 
 All participants achieved similar spans for the forward and reverse memory span 
tasks, but only years without a linguistic community came close to significantly relating 
to Reverse Total scores. As reverse span tasks have been argued to be a better measure of 
working memory (Eigsti 2001), we interpret this finding to mean that language may 
provide a better scaffold than educational experiences for the development of this 
executive function skill.   
Kessels et al. (2000) attempted to establish a standard of Corsi scoring by testing 
140 typically developing American adults. They found the mean forward Total score in 
this population to be between 40 and 50. The overall mean forward score across the 
groups in the current study was 28 (Figure 29); Homesigners had a mean score of 21.8, 
Cohort 1 37.5, and Unschooled Spanish Speakers 26. These results introduce a second 























Unschooled Spanish Speakers was to factor out language or education in any results from 
the NSL signers. Considering that the NSL signers have the highest mean forward score, 
it could be that their education, or even namely the fact that their education not only 
introduces them to a first, but also a second (written) language (Spanish) that may give 
them an extra boost.  
This isn’t unheard of, in fact Kovacs (2009) argues for the benefit for bilingualism 
in False Belief tasks. Could the bilingualism factor in to one of the supporting (e.g., 
perspective taking or EF skills) rather than directly into the False Belief task?  This will 
be addressed further in section 7. 
 
Figure 29: Number of participants (from all groups) in each forward Total Score range. 
 
 To be assured that participants understood the task, incorrect responses were also 
coded for items in which participants nevertheless included the correct blocks tapped 
(and only the correct blocks), regardless of sequence order. For forward memory spans, 
Homesigners tapped the correct blocks, but in the wrong order, 16% of the time, Cohort 1 
9% of the time, and Unschooled Spanish Speakers 22% of the time. For reverse memory 
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spans, all groups were more apt to tap the correct blocks in the wrong order, perhaps 
because of the impulse to imitate exactly (as in a forward memory span task) rather than 
respond with the reverse sequence.  Homesigners included the correct blocks for reverse 
memory span 34% of the time, Cohort 1 signers 29%, and Unschooled Spanish Speakers 
27%17. These results tell us two things: first, that the participants were still attempting to 
remember and produce the correct taps, and second, that they did understand the task. 
 Overall, working memory (measured by the reverse visuo-spatial span task) is 
significantly related to language exposure, and not to educational experience. 
6. Predictors of False Belief Performance 
  Given a previously suggested relationship between EF abilities and FB 
performance (e.g., Gordon & Olson, 1998; Carlson et al., 2002, 2004; a.o.), Spearman’s 
correlation coefficients were calculated to see if either working memory or inhibitory 
control were significantly related to overall success on the FB task. 
6.1 Participant data 
 Data from all participants who engaged in both the executive function (Working 
Memory and Inhibitory Control) tasks and the experiential False Belief tasks were 
included: 4 homesigning adults, 6 NSL signers (Cohort 1), and 5 unschooled Spanish 
speaking Nicaraguan adults. Overall False belief scores (of 0, 1, or 2) were used as the 
measure of each participant’s performance. 
6.2 Results 
Spearman’s correlation coefficients showed a significant relationship between 
                                                            
17 These percentages “incorrect” include those trials that went beyond what was deemed the 
participant’s “span.”  It is possible, therefore, that the last “correct” span that a participant 
produced was in the block of 5, but in the block of 6, he tapped the correct blocks, but in the 
wrong order. 
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Overall False Belief scores and Inhibitory Control (rs[13] = .55, p = 0.032), Corsi reverse 
span (rs[13] = .74, p = 0.001) and Corsi reverse score (rs[13] = .80, p < 0.001). No 
relationship was found between Overall False Belief scores and Corsi forward span 
(rs[13] = .22, p = 0.421) or Corsi forward score (rs[13] = .33, p = 0.222). 
6.3 Discussion 
  Our results confirmed the hypotheses that success on the False Belief task must 
somehow tap in to Executive Function abilities to suppress and transform (update) 
relevant information for understanding others’ beliefs, actions, and intentions. This is 
particularly striking because success on the FB task and on Working Memory (as 
measured by the reverse Spatial Span Total Score) was predicted by participants’ 
exposure to a linguistic community, while success on the conflict-IC was predicted by 
education and not age of language exposure. 
7. General Discussion 
7.1. Overall summary  
 This series of studies sought to investigate the relative contributions of social 
(life) experience and language experience (or participation in a linguistic community) to 
the development of Theory of Mind abilities. Because our population of interest, 
homesigners, have neither received any accessible language exposure nor any education, 
we needed to disentangle the effects of education on Theory of Mind development by 
introducing two other participant groups. We included NSL Cohort 1 signers who, like 
the homesigners, are deaf and have not received a language model. However, NSL 
signers differ from homesigners in that they participate in a linguistic community, mainly 
accessed via educational experiences. We also included Unschooled hearing Spanish 
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speakers, who had early exposure to rich language models but who, like the homesigners, 
had little to no schooling. 
The results show that some abilities are available to all groups, some are 
dependent on educational experience, and some are dependent on exposure to and 
participation in a linguistic community. 
7.1.1. Abilities available to all groups.  
 These results, taken together, suggest that certain aspects of Theory of Mind and 
Executive Function are available regardless of language exposure, education, or social 
experiences. Specifically, all participants across all groups were able to succeed at 
Perspective Taking Level 1 at 100% accuracy. Likewise, while there was variation in 
actual scores, no differences were found in accuracy between groups for Perspective 
Taking Level 2 tasks. While we can confidently rule out language or education as being a 
key factor to Perspective Taking Level 2 abilities, we cannot say for certain whether it is 
life experience or just pure visuo-spatial maturation that drives this development, and 
further investigation is necessary to explore variations between groups in the types of 
incorrect answers provided. 
 Similarly, we can say that the homesigners did not differ from the NSL signers 
nor from the Unschooled Spanish speakers on the Corsi forward tasks; namely those 
which tap in to pure spatial span memory (without the transformational element required 
for it to be “working” memory).  The same goes for the Inhibitory Control task’s 2nd 
phase, where the rule has changed from the first phase, but only one rule remains in 
effect.  Again, we cannot say for certain whether maturational or experiential effects are 
at play here. 
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Regardless, a benefit of these studies is that we now have evidence to show that 
these specific abilities do not suffer in individuals who are deaf and who do not have 
access to the spoken language around them. 
7.1.2. Differences due to education 
  The conflict-Inhibitory Control results are particularly striking in that they relate 
only to educational experiences and not to experience within a linguistic community. 
Thus, we can suggest that education, more than language, underpins Inhibitory Control, 
contra previous studies. Ostrosky-Solís and colleagues (2004) found no differences 
between participants with and without education on a task (the “opposites” task) that was 
similar to our control Phase 2. We have not located any studies that examine language or 
education effects on a Phase 3-type task, which requires participants to manage both 
same- and opposite-responses. The orally-educated deaf children in Shusterman et al.’s 
(2012) study showed delays in executive function relative to their hearing counterparts., 
Given our results, we speculate that later improvements in these deaf children’s EF would 
stem from additional educational experience rather than from further linguistic 
development. Interestingly, Contreras et al. (2013) found that Deaf individuals from Deaf 
parents outperformed deaf individuals from hearing parents, even into adulthood, 
seemingly arguing for a language-based foundation in EF abilities. It is possible that 
because their EF task was quite different than our IC task, it actually tapped into skills 
more akin to our Working Memory task, which we found was marginally significantly 
related to language exposure and not education.  For all deaf American populations, there 
is a potential for a language X education interaction: deaf children in the United States 
usually benefit from relatively early exposure to the school system, be it an oral/aural 
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program or a sign-language based program. It is possible that the early-signing 
participants in Contreras (2013) were able to capitalize on the education provided 
because they already had a fully accessible early language model. 
 Although no differences were found between groups for Perspective Taking Level 
2, there were some unexpected and interesting responses and challenges when working 
with the Unschooled Spanish speakers18. The difficulty seemed to stem from using 2-
dimensional images to portray a 3-dimensional object. When asked about the 
experimenter’s perspective of the duck as the duck faced the participant (Figure 30), a 
few times the participant selected his own perspective (Figure 30).  As this was a 
training/ practice phase, the experimenter responded with “I see the duck’s tail. Can you 
show me which picture shows what I see?” Yet again, the image in Figure 30 was 
selected.  The experimenter then responded with “Can you show me the tail in that 
 
Figure 30: The participant's perspective of the duck in one block of practice Perspective Taking trials. 
picture?” at which point the participant responded with “It’s behind the duck.”   
This interaction seems to show that the lack of schooling experience that the 
Spanish speaking participants had didn’t necessarily affect their ability to take another’s 
perspective as much as it means they didn’t have many opportunities to translate that 
knowledge into a new (2–dimensional) form (see Cole, 2005 for a discussion of the 
                                                            
18 Note that the testing of 3/6 of the unschooled Spanish speakers occurred at the farm where they 
lived and worked; very few 2-dimensional images were present in the form of printed media or 
photographs.  
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developmental effects of education). One can imagine a situation in which all 2-
dimensional images conjure up 3-dimensional expectations. In the end, of course if the 
duck is facing the participant, the tail is still there, and yes, it is actually facing the 
experimenter. 
Finally, we must consider that for the NSL signers, and for most deaf individuals 
attending a school that uses sign as the primary mode of communication, their experience 
is a bilingual experience.  Previous studies (e.g., Kovács, 2009) have suggested that there 
is a bilingual benefit for ToM development.  While the current series of studies isn’t 
specifically attuned to testing for bilingual effects, we can note that while we have 
controlled for general educational experiences, the bilingual (the local sign language and 
the majority written langauge – e.g., American Sign Langauge and written English, or 
Nicaraguan Sign Language and written Spanish) experience of deaf students may help 
them overcome any delays caused by their lack of native exposure to a linguistic 
community.  This highlights the benefit of studies like O’Reilly et al. (2014) who 
compare those with early sign exposure to late sign exposure (both who then later 
become sign / written language bilinguals) both in childhood and later on, in adulthood, 
with sensitive ToM assessments, such as with the use of sarcasm. 
7.1.3. Differences due to participation in a linguistic community 
 The main thrust of this study was to investigate the unique position of False 
Beliefs on the developmental cline of ToM-related abilities and to disentangle possible 
social vs. linguistic effects on the development of the understanding of False Beliefs. 
Given the results of our study, we can confidently say that it is not likely that social 
experiences (visual life experiences) are enough to scaffold False Belief understanding.  
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Language provided by participation in a linguistic community, however, does seem to be 
more crucially necessary for FB performance. 
 One way we can test the probable position of False Belief on the developmental 
cline (Figure 1), is to ask about the higher-order ToM abilities such as the use of sarcasm 
and narrative abilities. While the use of sarcasm hasn’t been investigated directly in 
homesigners, preliminary work by Coppola et al. (2013) and Miranda et al. (2014) shows 
that homesigners do suffer in their narrative productions. If their ToM development is 
somehow affected by their lack of exposure to a language model and linguistic 
community, then it follows that their narratives will be affected as well.  This may also be 
supported by research by Marschark et al. (2000), who show that deaf teens of hearing 
parents perform equivalently to hearing peers on use of mental state language in 
narrative, in spite of previous work showing that deaf children are delayed akin to 
individuals with autism.  
7.2 How do we know the participants understood the tasks? 
 A fundamental question in any work investigating cognition in homesigners is 
Did the participant understand the task?  While it is difficult to provide an 
unambiguously positive response to this question, the available evidence suggests that 
yes, participants, particularly the homesigners, understood what was being asked of them. 
7.2.1 Communication choices 
 To maximize understanding, the experimenter chose to use whichever 
communication means most readily available to the participant (Gesture, some NSL 
signs, spoken Spanish). While this may create differences in protocol or procedure, this 
was one strategy used to make sure that participants were clear for the task instructions.  
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All participants engaged in other tasks with the experimenter before and after the False 
Belief task, including the tasks described as part of this study.  During this time, the 
experimenter was able to learn the best means of communicating with each participant.  
Additionally, the homesigners’ success at some tasks (e.g., Spatial memory span, 
Perspective Taking, Conflict-Inhibitory Control) indicates that they are able to 
understand the experimenter and follow instructions as they were presented. This was, 
however, not the only means of achieving comprehension, for the design of the False 
Belief task itself guides the participant to the crucial question regardless of the 
communication method during the task. 
7.2.2 False Belief task: Comprehension checks are built-in to the task design 
 The experiential False Belief task modeled after Pyers (2005) has several built-in 
assurances to guide the participant to the crucial FB question (but not the right answer).  
This occurs mainly in Phase 1, or the sticker phase (Table 4).  Participants experienced 
“easy” or “obvious choice” trials in which they could easily predict the choices of the 
confederate.  They also experienced “hard” or “individual preference” trials during which 
they had to guess the confederate’s choice. They also earned incentives for making 
correct choices. All participants who failed to predict either False Belief trial either made 
a prediction about the confederate’s choice that was different from their own prior choice, 
or they experienced making an incorrect prediction, and therefore did not earn the 
incentive (allowing the experimenter to re-emphasize the goal of the prediction phase). 
Another, somewhat obvious feature built into the design is that the participant 
could have learned from his mistake in the first FB prediction.  If the participant was 
responding to the question “What should the confederate choose?” (what the participant 
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knows is in the box, or the plate the participant knows has the real cookies), then the 
expected pattern of results should include: a) some participants who would have passed 
Unexpected Contents only and / or b) fewer participants who failed both FB phases.  As 
trials were counterbalanced (some received the Appearance/Reality question before 
Unexpected Contents, and others the reverse), we can confirm that a) no participants 
learned from a failed Appearance Reality question and later passed an Unexpected 
Contents question, and b) we have many participants who were not able to succeed on 
either question.  Regardless, the question still stands: Perhaps the participants who failed 
to make a correct prediction were responding to what the confederate “should” choose 
rather than to what the confederate “will” choose.  
7.2.4  Understanding “Will” vs. “Should” 
 The question as to whether participants are responding to what “will” the 
confederate choose vs. what “should” the confederate choose is a difficult one.  It is still 
possible, after all the built-in strategies to encourage the participant to answer the 
intended FB question, that they still are adamant about predicting the “should” question 
through both FB phases. Perhaps they chalk the error up to the confederate?  Perhaps they 
think that the confederate is the one who should be learning, that this is somehow a 
teaching moment?  The deaf participants are probably used to engaging in gestural, 
object-based learning from interactions with their families.  This task could have been 
interpreted to be that type of event. If that were the case, however, it does not explain the 
behavior of the hearing Spanish speakers who also failed to make correct predictions 
despite the use of Spanish in their instructions: “Qué crees que él va a eligir?” (What do 
you think he will choose?), which makes the contrast between “will” and “should” 
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explicit. The upshot is that there is no definitive way to be sure which question the 
participants were answering; however, all attempts were made to ensure comprehension 
within the constraints of working with a language-limited population. 
 
7.3. Factoring in the experience of deaf individuals 
 While we cannot completely account for the Unschooled Spanish Speakers’ 
failures to predict the confederate’s choices, it is possible that the homesigners and 
Cohort 1 participants might be reacting either to the confederate’s white male status, his 
American status, or his “hearing” status – that is, they may not want to attribute “not 
knowing” to the confederate for any one of these reasons.  
It is a common anecdote in the American Deaf experience, or in the experience of 
the hearing people around D/deaf people, for the D/deaf person to attribute more 
situational or incidental knowledge to a hearing person than may be warranted. This, in a 
way, isn’t very surprising, given differences in sensory experiences. For example, take a 
situation in which a hearing person says to a deaf person “John is here” when John isn’t 
visible yet, but the hearing person, who is familiar with John’s gait, hears that pattern 
coming from the hallway. With repeated instances like this, it is not unreasonable for the 
deaf person to later ask a hearing person “Who is at the door?” when the doorbell has 
been rung but no one has yet opened the door.   
 Given these types of experiences, it is possible that the deaf participants 
(homesigners and NSL signers) in this study may have attributed more knowledge to the 
hearing confederate than, say, the Unschooled Spanish Speakers may have, given the 
common experience (across the three participant groups) of being from the same country/ 
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culture faced with a white American male confederate.  
7.4 Do homesigners really have no understanding of others’ thoughts and beliefs?  
 So, what does this mean?  Does it mean that the individuals in this study who 
failed the False Belief tasks do not have any understanding of others’ thoughts, beliefs 
and desires?  Consider the experience of these participants, who are living in a hearing 
world – one filled with individuals who have greater access to information through their 
ability to hear. It remains possible that there isn’t enough observable evidence (from the 
deaf person’s perspective) to infer what a hearing person could and could not know, 
without possessing language to scaffold that understanding.  Thus, for these individuals, 
developing a Theory of Mind may actually mean developing the understanding that 
others are not omniscient.  This differs from the traditional child-centered explanation for 
why preschoolers fail the FB task, where the assumption is that the child assumes that the 
puppet or confederate only knows what he or she (the participant) knows.  
 There is spontaneous evidence to show that the homesigners do have a sense of 
others’ thoughts and beliefs; stories where they talk about others not seeing or not being 
aware of something happening.  This is reflective, however, of understanding seeing and 
knowing, but not actually mentally representing the belief of someone else, only their 
ignorance.  It is argued that the belief representation is much more complex because it 
involves a representation that is counter to reality; that is what was tested with the 
Experiential False Belief task. 
 It is also likely that the homesigners could pass a Theory of Mind task if it were 
designed for infants (e.g., one like those described in Onishi & Baillargeon (2005)).  
Apperly & Butterfill (2009) make a strong case for a two-system Theory of Mind 
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process, one that, like number cognition, has a basic, almost innate set of abilities to track 
attitudes and behaviors, and another that is much more cognitive and flexible, given 
certain other cognitive abilities, such as the Executive Functions.  Their suggestion is 
appealing for a case like this: we have evidence here that language plays a part in the 
development of these additional cognitive abilities, but these cognitive abilities still have 
a strong relationship with False Belief success, even if that False Belief is an exact replica 
of one’s own experiences. 
 In sum, it is likely that the homesigners are very attuned to the environment 
around them; but this includes the “evidence” that hearing people are able to understand, 
perceive, and “know” more than they do. The same goes for the Unschooled Spanish 
speakers – perhaps they were also attributing some sort of knowledge to the white male 
confederate? Once we factor in the results from the Perspective Taking Level 2 task, 
where we saw that participants sometimes struggled with responding either with their 
own perspective versus any other (correct or incorrect) perspective.  This was reflective 
of the differences between understanding that others have a different perspective than 
their own and the ability to actually imagine, or mentalize that other perspective or 
experience – this could be an example of overloading the cognitive system as suggested 
by Apperly & Butterfill (2009). Perhaps then, that is what exists in the gap between 
language and education– a sort of skepticism about others’ abilities and the means to 
mentalize and later discuss it. 
7.5 Limitations and improvements 
 We acknowledge some limitations. First, Homesigners, NSL Signers, and 
Unschooled Spanish-speaking adults are extremely rare and difficult to recruit and test, 
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yielding small sample sizes. Also, we did not administer any standard IQ tasks. Over 
many years of interaction with the research group, the homesigners have not exhibited 
signs of congenital cognitive deficits, nor have their parents reported evidence of such 
deficits. Further, their performance on perceptual matching and mental rotation tasks is in 
the same range as that of their hearing family members (Spaepen et al, 2011).  
Future work will: 1) utilize implicit measures of FB performance, such as eyegaze or 
looking time measures 2) attempt to include a deaf, Nicaraguan confederate to level the 
playing field and remove some of the possible assumptions on the part of the participants 
and 3) include American deaf participants and hearing Nicaraguan preschoolers as 
additional comparison groups. 
8. Conclusion 
Four studies were conducted investigating the effects of language and education 
on perspective taking, false belief understanding and executive function performance in 
three Nicaraguan groups: Homesigners, who do not participate in a linguistic community 
and have little schooling; Nicaraguan Sign Language Signers, who were among the initial 
creators of this emerging language, and Unschooled Spanish Speakers, members of a 
linguistic community, with sparse education. 
The results suggest four conclusions: 1) a linguistic community is necessary, but 
not sufficient, to support success on False Belief tasks; 2) education, more than language, 
relates to Inhibitory Control; 3) a linguistic community is likely necessary for 
transformational (“working”) memory, and 4) executive function abilities (Inhibitory 
Control and Working Memory) are related to false belief performance. 
These results support theories in which language may play a crucial role in the 
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development of theory of mind. According to simulation theorists, having an experience 
of a false belief shortly before predicting the response of another individual holding the 
same false belief in the very same situation would eliminate the need for language, and 
indicate that life experience and introspection supports the understanding of others’ 
beliefs and actions. The results show that life experiences, even those experienced 
immediately prior to prediction, did not help adults without a linguistic community. Thus, 
Simulation (and related) theories (e.g., Gordon, 1986; Goldman, 1992, Nickerson, 1999) 
cannot explain the behavior of homesigners in these experiential tasks; homesigners who 
presumably reflect on their own experiences, yet remain unable to leverage that reflection 
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